Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Atomism' and 'Concepts'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C]
If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C]
A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka]