Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'There Are No Abstract Objects' and 'Plurals and Complexes'

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31 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10676 The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
10686 The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10687 Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10677 Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10671 Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10666 Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
10669 Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
10675 A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
10673 Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
10680 The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10684 I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10674 A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10681 In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
10685 Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10668 We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
14596 Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
14597 Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10664 Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
10678 The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10665 Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
10682 The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14598 Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
10663 A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
10683 We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]