Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'' and 'Realistic Rationalism'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
2510 Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
2516 Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
9456 Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9457 The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
9458 Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
9461 Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
2521 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
2513 We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
2522 Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2517 Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2519 It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
2520 Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
9460 Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
9459 Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
2518 Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]