25 ideas
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
3804 | Darwin's idea was the best idea ever [Dennett] |