Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root''

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15 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer]