Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'Modal Realism at Work: Properties' and 'Aspects of Scientific Explanation'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems

13917

Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

13919

Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets

4038	Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects

13918

Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

13921

All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

13922

Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity

13920

Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction

22179

Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations

6755	For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]

17083

The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

13052

Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]