32 ideas
| 13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
| 17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
| 13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
| 17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
| 17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
| 17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
| 17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
| 17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
| 17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
| 17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
| 17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
| 17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
| 17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
| 17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
| 13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
| 13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
| 17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
| 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
| 17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
| 17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
| 17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
| 17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |