18 ideas
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |