31 ideas
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
6230 | If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth] |
6228 | Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
6229 | Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
6225 | Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
6224 | An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth] |
6223 | If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth] |
6226 | The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth] |