16 ideas
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |