Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'First Things First' and 'Philosophy without Intuitions'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems

13917

Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

13919

Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments

20183

So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects

13918

Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

13921

All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

13922

Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity

13920

Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition

20182

The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen]

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism

19520

Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

19521

If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]

19522

More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]

19523

Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]