18 ideas
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
21386 | We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
14051 | A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus] |
1828 | God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus] |