16 ideas
| 6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 13230 | Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 13229 | Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M] |
| 13231 | Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
| 6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
| 6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |