16 ideas
17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
21906 | Political theory should not focus on the state or economy, but on the small scale of power [Deleuze/Guattari, by May] |