Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'Letters to Queen Charlotte' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

15 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13917 Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
13919 Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
23026 We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
13918 Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
13189 A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
13921 All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13922 Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13920 Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
19432 Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
19430 We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
19431 There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]