Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?' and 'works'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain? [Dance]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard]