Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion' and 'Being and Nothingness'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
22227 For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
20743 Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
6151 Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6164 Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7074 Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
6687 Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
22228 Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
22233 Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
20755 Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
20760 Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
22231 We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]