Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Positions' and 'The Unimportance of Identity'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
8216 Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
8213 I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
5515 Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5516 Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
5514 Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
5521 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
5522 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
5519 It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
5520 If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
5518 It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]