22 ideas
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |