Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself' and 'Naturalizing the Mind'

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24 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5806 Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
5801 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
3978 Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
5802 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
5809 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5808 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5804 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
3977 Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]