18 ideas
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |