60 ideas
| 24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
| 24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
| 24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
| 24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
| 24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
| 24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
| 24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
| 24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
| 24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |