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All the ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'System of Logic' and 'Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology'

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83 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer]
If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill]
Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill]
There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill]
Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill]
Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill]
Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill]
'2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill]
3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill]
Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill]
We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill]
Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill]
12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill]
Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill]
Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill]
The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill]