Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity' and 'De Re and De Dicto'

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
14650 Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
14648 Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17306 If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
17304 As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14647 Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14646 An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14642 Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
14643 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
14649 Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14651 What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
17308 Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17305 I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
17307 Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]