24 ideas
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |