Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'On 'The Beginning of Philosophy'' and 'Truthmaking for Presentists'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]