Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'Truth and the Past' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett]