33 ideas
22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |