26 ideas
14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |
8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |