12 ideas
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
22235 | Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |