16 ideas
| 13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
| 13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
| 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
| 5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
| 19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
| 14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
| 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
| 13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
| 13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
| 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
| 19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
| 18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
| 5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
| 5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
| 4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |