Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles' and 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?'

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20 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
15959 If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
15956 The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
11980 A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11982 If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
11983 It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
11985 If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15975 Can the qualities of a body be split into two groups, where the smaller explains the larger? [Alexander,P]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
15963 Science has been partly motivated by the belief that the universe is run by God's laws [Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
15951 Alchemists tried to separate out essences, which influenced later chemistry [Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
15981 Absolute space either provides locations, or exists but lacks 'marks' for locations [Alexander,P]