Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Truth' and 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8893 For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
10842 The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
10843 Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
10844 The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10841 The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
8888 The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
8887 It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
8897 The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8896 Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8891 My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
8892 Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
8894 Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8889 Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
8890 If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
8895 If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]