14 ideas
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |