29 ideas
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
4787 | Causation interaction is an exchange of conserved quantities, such as mass, energy or charge [Dowe, by Psillos] |
14586 | Physical causation consists in transference of conserved quantities [Dowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |