16 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |