Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'The Common-Sense View of Reality' and 'The Philosophy of Mathematics'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
20728 Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
9193 ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett]
9194 The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9195 Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
9186 First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9187 Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
9191 Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
9192 The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20729 Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
20730 If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
20731 The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]