Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Quaestiones de Potentia Dei' and 'Briefings on Existence'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou]
There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou]
Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou]
The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou]