12 ideas
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |