13 ideas
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
| 22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
| 22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
| 22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
| 18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |