13 ideas
| 6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| 3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |