14 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |