Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contextualism Contested', 'The Empirical Stance' and 'Propositions'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
12772 Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
12771 Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
12773 Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12770 We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19215 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
19209 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19208 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
19207 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19214 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
12890 That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
12892 Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
12769 Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
12768 We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19202 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
19204 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
19210 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19212 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
19213 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]