14 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |