Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Investigations', 'Letters to Frege' and 'Contingent Identity'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
15570 Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt]
7614 Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam]
6893 Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
13365 Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
10711 Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9127 Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
21216 Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7531 We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]