68 ideas
| 7846 | Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 20107 | How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche] |
| 13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
| 20352 | Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20379 | Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche] |
| 13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
| 13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
| 9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
| 9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
| 17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
| 20123 | First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche] |
| 13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
| 13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
| 13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
| 9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
| 13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
| 20105 | Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche] |
| 13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
| 13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
| 13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
| 13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
| 13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
| 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
| 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
| 13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
| 13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
| 20376 | We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
| 13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
| 13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
| 13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
| 13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
| 13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
| 13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
| 13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
| 13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
| 21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 22500 | Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche] |
| 20128 | Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
| 22503 | Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 8041 | The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche] |
| 20135 | Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
| 20353 | The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20113 | Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche] |
| 22475 | Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 22476 | Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 20104 | Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche] |
| 7847 | Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 9782 | Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek] |
| 20102 | Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche] |
| 20106 | Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski] |
| 20124 | Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche] |
| 20367 | Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche] |
| 20371 | Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20108 | Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche] |
| 13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
| 13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
| 13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
| 13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
| 13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
| 13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
| 13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
| 13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |