43 ideas
| 19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
| 22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
| 19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
| 19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
| 19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
| 19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
| 19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
| 19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
| 19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
| 13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
| 3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
| 3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
| 19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
| 19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
| 9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
| 9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
| 17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
| 3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
| 16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
| 5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
| 9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
| 21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |