Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Human Nature', 'Propositions' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


37 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO]
Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO]
Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO]