14 ideas
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |