22 ideas
18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |